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If the term ‘Cooperative Security’ is rarely used in European Union (EU) parlance, 
it is at the heart of the EU’s approach to security as expressed in its 2003 European 
Security Strategy (ESS),2 together with its comprehensive or holistic nature and its 
emphasis on conflict prevention.  
First of all, and traditionally perhaps, Cooperative Security is pursued in 
what the EU calls its ‘Neighbourhood’: ‘Our task is to promote a ring of well-
governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the 
Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations’, says the 
ESS. The EU pursues this via a strategy of positive conditionality: partnership and 
access to European markets are to stimulate security cooperation and political, 
social and economic reforms, thus spreading the EU’s model and values. 
Cooperative Security and comprehensive or holistic security are thus two sides of 
the same coin. 
More recent is the extension of Cooperative Security at the global level, 
under the guise of ‘effective multilateralism’: ‘We need to pursue our objectives 
both through multilateral cooperation in international organizations and through 
partnerships with key actors’, according to the ESS, which calls for ‘Strategic 
Partnerships’ with ‘all those who share our goals and values and are prepared to 
act in their support’. This extension of the approach at the global level goes hand 
in hand with the EU’s slow but steady development as a global actor, and is 
provoked by the current global environment. Marked by increasing multipolarity, 
i.e. the rise of ‘emerging’ or ‘re-emerging’ global actors, the ‘changing world 
order’ creates a sense of urgency. These powers include Brazil, Russia, India and 
China, commonly known as the BRIC’s, as well as other States with a global scope 
in one or more policy areas. For Cooperative Security and multilateralism to work 
and peaceful resolution of disputes to continue, these States too, many of which 
have a very different model and values from that of the EU, have to be integrated 
and socialized into the web of regimes, treaties and institutions. The world is not 
just increasingly multipolar, it is also characterized by increasing interdependence 
between the poles, which ought to facilitate cooperation. Although other global 
actors often have different worldviews and competing objectives, all are 
increasingly interlinked economically, and all are confronted with the same 
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complex global challenges. Giovanni Grevi has dubbed this condition 
‘interpolarity’: global interdependence is so great that ‘its mismanagement can 
threaten not only the prosperity, but the political stability and ultimately, in 
extreme cases, the very survival of the actors that belong to the system’; therefore 
‘the ability to shape multilateral cooperation or lead collective action in addressing 
international challenges becomes a central feature of power’.3   
The ‘interpolar’ world thus presents both a challenge and an opportunity for 
Cooperative Security. In December 2008, after a year-long debate about the ESS, 
the EU confirmed its approach in ‘a report on the Implementation of the European 
Security Strategy — Providing Security in a Changing World’.4 The report 
perceives a crucial window of opportunity: ‘At a global level, Europe must lead a 
renewal of the multilateral order. (...) We have a unique moment to renew 
multilateralism, working with the United States and with our partners around the 
world’. But are the EU’s traditional, conditionality-based policies sufficient to 
achieve this?  
 
Cooperation rather than conditionality  
Arguably, what is most distinctive about the EU is what can be called the 
European social model: the combination of democracy, the market economy, and 
strong state intervention, at Member State and EU level, to ensure regulation of the 
economy and social security. This model, including the values on which it is 
based, can be conceptualized as an integral whole of public goods, to which every 
citizen is entitled, and which it is the responsibility of government to provide to 
every citizen: security or freedom from fear; economic prosperity or freedom 
from want; political freedom, i.e. democracy, respect for human rights, and the 
rule of law; and social well-being, i.e. health, education, and a sustainable 
environment.5 An assessment of the conditions that have to be fulfilled for this 
model to prosper, allows identification of the EU’s vital interests, i.e. those that 
determine the very survival of its model: the absence of a vital military threat to 
the territory of the Union; open lines of communication and trade (in physical as 
well as in cyber space); a secure energy supply; a clean and stable environment; 
manageable migration flows; the maintenance of international law and universally 
agreed rights; and autonomy of EU decision-making.  
In an ‘interpolar’ world, without direct enemies to the EU, and in which 
cooperation to tackle common challenges is vital, the best way of defending EU 
interests in order to defend its model and values, is precisely to spread those 
values. Increasing the access of citizens worldwide to these same core public 
goods directly addresses the root causes of threats and challenges. In other words, 
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if the fundamental objective of the EU is the preservation and strengthening of the 
European social model and the values on which it is based, the best way of 
achieving that is to promote it in the rest of the world, which moreover constitutes 
a positive agenda in its own right.6   
However, vis-à-vis other global actors, the classic EU strategy of ‘positive 
conditionality’ has great limitations. Interdependence is too great and the scale of 
things is too vast for the EU to have any serious leverage. On the contrary, 
pontificating without acting only serves to undermine EU soft power. Global 
powers cannot be enticed by the offer of the proverbial carrot — they can only be 
convinced of the value of the EU model through practical cooperation on concrete 
issues, on the basis of shared interests and common challenges.  
 
A new instrument: Strategic Partnerships  
The EU has therefore created a new instrument to engage with other global actors: 
Strategic Partnerships. The actual strategy behind these is far from clear, 
however. 
A first and major problem is the lack of understanding of the concept of 
Strategic Partnership. It has never been defined and is consequently seen and 
interpreted differently by many actors within the EU, without mentioning those 
outside the EU. Similarly, the objectives of the Strategic Partnerships are ill-
defined. Apart from installing various annual meetings and summits, it is not clear 
what the creation of a Strategic Partnership entails: which common objectives and 
especially joint actions are to be pursued in which policy areas? Who takes the 
lead in these partnerships on the EU side? Often it appears as if the existence of a 
partnership is more important than its content and its potential for the EU and for 
the bilateral relationship. Of course, Strategic Partnerships are a well-understood 
means to insert a new dynamic into a relationship that is deemed to be important. 
They also aim at providing a ‘comprehensive, coherent, and coordinated long-
term framework’7 to the relationship. But the role of these partnerships in the 
context of ‘effective multilateralism’ remains unclear.  
Another major problem relates to the countries that qualify for a Strategic 
Partnership. There are few established criteria, except that partnerships can be 
signed with ‘third countries, and international, regional or global organisations 
which share the principles (of democracy, the rule of law, the universality and 
indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human 
dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of 
the United Nations Charter and international law)’ (Lisbon Treaty, Article 22) and 
that ‘the strategic partner status is specifically intended to derive from the capacity 
of a country to exert a significant influence on global issues’.8 At this point, not 
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counting relations with the US, Canada and NATO, the EU has or is negotiating 
seven Strategic Partnerships with other States (Brazil, China, India, Japan, 
Mexico, Russia, and South Africa), and one with an international organization 
(the African Union). It seems quite obvious that not each of these is equally 
strategic. Most of these countries undeniably exercise regional leadership or are a 
significant player for one specific global issue. This makes them strategic as 
regards one region, or one issue. But is this a sufficient condition to make them a 
strategic partner? Can Mexico and South Africa really be put on an identical level 
with China, Russia and the United States?  
The danger is to overstretch the concept, on the one hand, leading to an 
amalgam between important relationships and strategic relationships. Such 
overstretch creates confusion within the EU, but also in the eyes of its partners and 
in the way they interpret Europe’s ambitions. On the other hand, there is an equal 
— and tightly related — risk of diluting the symbolic but real importance of the 
concept with each new partnership. ‘Strategic Partnership’ has become a very 
fashionable term, emptied of its true substance.  
 
Towards a strategic use  
A truly strategic use of the Strategic Partnerships, i.e. in function of EU foreign 
policy, must start from a thorough assessment of EU interests in the various 
regions of the globe and a clearer definition of its objectives towards them. At the 
same time, a prioritization of actions to be taken to tackle the global challenges, in 
function of the Union’s vital interests, is in order. On many of these issues — 
climate, migration, energy — the EU already has elaborate policies — these must 
be integrated into its broader foreign policy framework. Finally, the EU must 
sharpen its view on how best to organize the multilateral architecture. To be 
effective and legitimate, the multilateral architecture must evidently be adapted to 
take into account the growing importance of the ‘emerging’ global actors. Can the 
EU, which clearly is over-represented, contribute to such reforms while making its 
own representation more effective, e.g. by compensating for the loss of European 
seats by speaking much more with one voice? Which are the EU’s preferred 
multilateral forums? Which organizations are best suited to deal with which issues, 
which reforms must be undertaken to strengthen their effectiveness and 
legitimacy, and how can the EU act united within them? How does the EU assess 
the growing role of the G20 e.g., how ought it to be represented there, and what 
should be the position of the G20 vis-à-vis the UN? The EU cannot afford to dither, 
for things are moving fast, as the rise of the G20 demonstrates. Without proactive 
EU involvement, Europe will be running behind the facts.  
Taken together, these regional, global and institutional interests and 
objectives could inform a really strategic use of the Strategic Partnerships. Rather 
than objectives in their own right, the Strategic Partnerships are instruments to 
further ‘effective multilateralism’. The EU could identify shared interests with 
each of its strategic partners, in order to establish in a number of priority policy 
areas effective practical cooperation with those strategic partners that share EU 
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interests in that specific domain, with the ultimate aim of institutionalizing those 
forms of cooperation and linking them up with the permanent multilateral 
institutions. Such a pragmatic approach of coalition-building and practical 
cooperation, on very specific issues to start with, can expand into broader areas, 
including with regard to values. If e.g. it is unlikely that we will see China at the 
forefront of democracy promotion, it has an economic interest in promoting the 
rule of law, if only to ensure that the mining concessions it acquires are not 
simultaneously offered to someone else. Such a process could allow the EU to 
gradually and consensually increase the minimal standards to which everyone 
should adhere, thus slowly but surely strengthening the recognition of the 
universality of our values, while steadily increasing the integration of other global 
powers into a tight web of cooperative relations.  
Rather than asking with which State or organization a Strategic Partnership 
should be concluded, the EU should look beyond those already in existence and 
involve actors in constructive cooperation in function of their power in the specific 
area concerned. In practice, two types of partners may eventually emerge: those 
with which the EU establishes cooperation in a comprehensive range of areas — 
probably at least Russia, China and India, if they would be inclined to such 
cooperation that is, and of course the US; and those with whom cooperation 
focuses on a more limited range of issues or regions.  
For the Strategic Partnerships to work, the EU must speak with one voice — 
other global actors are only too adept at playing one Member State against the 
other. ‘Self-divide and be ruled over’ is not a strategy bound to serve European 
interests. At the very least, Member States should subscribe to a rule of 
transparency and automatically inform the EU, at an early stage, of all important 
bilateral arrangements with strategic partners, so as to allow for debate in the EU 
institutions and de-conflicting of potentially competing interests. Ideally, on key 
issues, Strategic Partnerships could establish the EU as the unique interlocutor on a 
series of key issues, hence limiting the margin of manoeuvre of individual 
Member States.  
 
Conclusion  
In a globalized and multipolar work, Cooperative Security or ‘effective 
multilateralism’ is as important as ever. The condition of ‘interpolarity’ does not 
guarantee the absence of tension or strife between the powers, but it constitutes a 
great opportunity. In the past international stability under conditions of 
multipolarity has been possible for long periods, when shared objectives linked the 
great powers together in a social contract which all subscribed to, not out of 
altruism, but because it allowed them to maintain great power status and to secure 
their vital interests.9 No environment could be more amenable to the creation of 
such a social contract than interpolarity. In that context, the EU’s Strategic 
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Partnerships are a very promising instrument. Without strategy, the Strategic 
Partnerships will quickly become irrelevant. With a strategy, they can potentially 
become very effective instruments of a united European foreign policy.  
 
 
 
 
